We present a repeated prisoners' dilemma game with imperfect public monitoring, which exhibits the following paradoxical feature: the equilibrium payoff set expands and asymptotically achieves full efficiency as the public signal becomes less sensitive to the hiden actions of the players. * We would like to thank Drew Fudenberg and David Levine for helpful comments and discussion.
Introduction
Repeated games with imperfect public monitoring provide an analytical framework to study long term relationships, where participants have imperfect public information about each other's hidden action. Now welldeveloped theory (including Abreu-Pearce-Stacchetti [1] and FudenbergLevine-Maskin [5] , FLM hereafter) shows how the participants can utilize the imperfect information to achieve cooperation in such a setting. Our intuition suggests that, as the observability of actions improves, it should become easier to sustain cooperation. In fact, Kandori [6] has formalized this idea, by showing that the equilibrium payoff set expands, when observability improves according to the standard definition in the statistical decision theory (Blackwell and Girshick [2] ). In this paper we point out subtlety involved in this issue and show that the above intuitive idea about the observability and cooperation should be taken with a pinch of salt. In particular, we present a repeated game with imperfect public monitoring, which has the following seemingly paradoxical feature: the equilibrium payoff set expands and asymptotically achieves full efficiency as the public information becomes less sensitive to the hidden actions of the players.
Our example is quite simple. We consider the standard prisoner's dilemma stage game with the following payoff table.
where d, h > 0 (D is dominant) and d − h < 1 ((C, C) is efficient 1 ). Actions are not observable 2 , but the players publicly observe a signal ω ∈ Ω ≡ {X, Y }. We suppose that the probability of signal ω given action profile a ∈ {C, D} × {C, D}, denoted p(ω|a), is symmetric (i.e., p(ω|a 1 , a 2 ) = p(ω|a 2 , a 1 )) and satisfies p(X | C, C) < p(X | C, D), and 1 This is the condition that (C, C) Pareto-dominates the public randomization between (D, C) and (C, D) with an equal probability. 2 We assume that the realized payoff of a player is a function of his own action and the signal (so that a player cannot detect the opponent's action simply by looking at his realized payoff), and we denote it by u i (a i , ω). The payoff table represents the expected payoff gi(a) = P ω∈Ω ui(ai, ω)p(ω|a), where p(ω|a) is the probability of ω given action profile a. Throughout the paper we hold the expected payoff fixed when we change the information structure p(ω|a). One can check that such an operation is possible with a suitable choice of ui(ai, ω).
p(Y | D, C) < p(Y | D, D).
That is, one defection makes X more likely, while an additional defection makes Y more likely.
We show that this familiar stage game exhibits the following paradoxical feature: As the signal becomes less sensitive to a deviation at the efficient point (C, C), (i.e., p(X | C, C)−p(X | D, C) → 0), the asymptotic payoff set lim δ→∞ E(δ) expands and converges to the set of all feasible and individually rational payoffs. (Here we denote the (public perfect) equilibrium payoff set in the repeated game under discount factor δ by E(δ)). Moreover, this can be true even if observability is reduced everywhere (not just at the efficient point): As p(ω|a) for all ω and a converges to one point (so that a deviation at any point becomes hard to detect), the asymptotic payoff set expands and converges to the set of all feasible and individually rational payoffs.
The mechanism operating behind our example is a familiar one (at least to the specialists in repeated games). Our point is to show that the familiar mechanism can operate in a subtle and disguised way. For this reason (and just for fun) we pause here for a moment and ask the reader if s/he can see how our example works. The answer is given in the next section and we show how the trick is done.
Intuitive Explanation
The key for our result is the efficiency of asymmetric punishment. When monitoring is imperfect, a "bad" outcome arises with a positive probability even if no player deviates. To provide incentives to cooperate, a punishment should be triggered in such an eventuality. If all players are simultaneously punished (as in the trigger strategy), welfare loss is inevitable. However, when each player's action affects the signal asymmetrically, we can use an asymmetric punishment scheme to avoid welfare loss; if player 1's deviation is suspected, we transfer 1's future payoff to player 2 (and vice versa). When the discount factor δ is close to 1, such a transfer can be made in a close vicinity of the Pareto frontier, and therefore the welfare loss vanishes as δ → 1. Furthermore, this conclusion is independent of how informative the signal is (as long as each player's deviation affects the signal asymmetrically). This is the basic driving force in the FLM folk theorem [5] .
In our example, each player's action affects the signal symmetrically at the efficient pint (C, C) (each player's deviation makes X more likely), so that we are unable to use the efficient asymmetric punishment at this point. Hence, the above argument seemingly implies that efficiency cannot be achieved. However, consider a nearby point (D ε , C), where D ε denotes the mixed strategy which plays C and D with probabilities (1 − ε) and ε > 0 respectively. Player 1's defection makes X more likely at this point, as at (C, C). What about player 2's defection? The distribution of signal when player 2 takes action a 2 is given by
Now suppose that the first term is sufficiently insensitive to a 2 . Then, player 2's action affects the signal mostly through the second term. As we have p(Y |D, C) < p(Y |D, D), we conclude that player 2's defection makes Y more likely at this point. Hence, each player's action affects the signal asymmetrically at (D ε , C), so that the efficient asymmetric punishment is feasible. Note that ε can be made arbitrarily small as the signal becomes insensitive at the efficient point (C, C). Hence, as the observability decreases, the asymmetric punishment becomes feasible at almost efficient point (D ε , C) (and symmetrically at (C, D ε )). This is the source of efficiency in our examples. Hence, the crux of the matter is the feasibility of asymmetric punishment and not the amount of information per se. The twist of our example is that the former is attained only when the observability of actions is decreased (in a broad sense). Now let us make the above argument more precisely. At (D ε , C), the change in the probability of Y when player 2 deviates is equal to
If this is positive, player 2's defection at (D ε , C) makes Y more likely, so that each player's action affects the signal asymmetrically, as we desire. The above expression (1) can be rearranged as
Hence, (1) is positive if and only if
Since (D ε , C) is not an efficient profile, this lower bound for ε prevents us from obtaining full efficiency for a given ξ > 0. However, this lower bound vanishes when the observability of deviation at (C, C) is reduced (i.e., ξ → 0). Furthermore, the same is true even when the observability of action is reduced everywhere (i.e., ξ → 0 and ∆ → 0) as long as ∆ converges to 0 at a slower rate than ξ. Thus we can employ an asymmetric punishment while approximating the efficient action profile (C, C) arbitrarily closely as ξ → 0 for such ∆.
Although this is the essence of our argument, we should address other non-trivial issues to obtain the formal proof. First, when supporting ((1 − ε)C + εD, C), player 1 must be indifferent between C and D. This indifference condition determines the level of transfer between 1 and 2 in the efficient asymmetric punishment. In general, this transfer may not be sufficient to deter player 2's deviation. We will show 3 that this does not happen when ξ → 0 and ξ/∆ → 0. Second, we need to show that the continuation payoffs in the asymmetric punishment are also sustained by the repeated game equilibria. The detailed analysis is given in the next section.
Lastly, let us comment on the relationship to the folk theorem under imperfect public monitoring (FLM [5] ). Our example does not satisfy the FLM conditions for the folk theorem for each ξ > 0 and neither in the limit ξ → 0. Their pairwise full rank condition requires that there is at least one (potentially mixed) action profile α for which matrix 
has rank 3. Obviously, this is impossible, because this matrix has only two columns. However, our example is based on the fundamental idea of FLM, the efficiency of asymmetric punishment. The point here is that the pairwise full rank condition is a sufficient condition to facilitate the efficient asymmetric punishment, but it is not necessary. The essence of our example is that (i) the efficient asymmetric punishment is feasible at some points, even though the pairwise full rank condition fails, and (ii) those points can be arbitrarily close to the efficient point, as the observability is reduced. This suggests that we may obtain the folk theorem without the pairwise full rank condition. In fact, we show in Section 4 that we can modify this model to obtain a fairly simple example which satisfies the folk theorem without the pairwise full rank condition. We present the formal statement of our result and its proof in the next section, and then offer some discussion (on the relationship to the folk theorem in Section 4, and on the relationship to Kandori [6] in the last section).
Analysis
We denote player i 0 s expected payoff given a ∈ A = A 1 × A 2 by g i (a) , and, by abusing notation, g i (α) for player i 0 s expected payoff given a mixed action profile α ∈ 4A 1 × 4A 2 . Let V * be the individually rational and feasible set, i.e. V * = {v ∈ Cog(A)|v ≥ 0}, where Cog(A) denotes the convex hull of set g(A) = {v|v = g(a), a ∈ A}. Note that in the prisoners' dilemma game we consider, 0 is the minimax payoff for each player.
We are going to use Fudenberg and Levine's algorithm to compute the asymptotic equilibrium payoff set ( [4] ). Let us briefly summarize their method for readers' convenience. For a given welfare weight vector λ ∈ < 2 Â {0} and a mixed action profile α, let k * (α, λ) be the maximized value for the following optimization problem 4 .
where suppα i is the support of α i . Roughly speaking, the term x in the above optimization problem represents the variation in continuation payoffs, and the constraint λ · x (ω) ≤ 0 ensures that the payoff variations lie in the equilibrium payoff set. Let k * (λ) = sup α k * (α, λ) and H (λ) be a half-space given by
, and denote the set of public perfect equilibrium 5 payoffs for discount factor δ by E(δ). Then, it is known that the following is true.
Let us parametrize the information structure by
while p(ω|C, C) is fixed. To indicate explicitly the dependence of Q in the above result on the parameter ξ, we denote it by Q(ξ). We examine how Q (ξ) is affected by ξ. For each ξ, we can show that Q (ξ) is a strict subset of V * . In particular, it is bounded away from the efficient payoff profile (1, 1) . However, we show that Q (ξ) expands and supports almost all individually rational payoff profile as ξ converges to 0 as long as ∆ (ξ) is bounded away from 0 or converges to 0 at much slower rate. Therefore the full efficiency is achieved only in the limit as ξ → 0. One example of such information structure would be p(X | C, C) = 1/2 and ∆ (ξ) = ξ + 1/4 (so that p(Y | D, D) = 3/4 is constant). Another example would be p(X | C, C) = 1/2 and ∆ (ξ) = √ ξ (so that p(ω|a) → 1/2 for all ω and a, as ξ → 0). Now we prove the following result. Recall that E(δ) is the set of public perfect equilibrium payoffs under discount factor δ. Note also that 6 , for any δ
Theorem 1 For each ξ > 0, the equilibrium payoffs are bounded away from the efficient point (1, 1); there is a neighborhood of (1, 1) which lies outside of lim δ→1 E (δ). However, as the signal becomes less sensitive to actions (ξ → 0), the inefficiency vanishes and we can sustain all feasible and individually rational payoffs
The proof of this theorem is given by the Fudenberg-Levine Algorithm and the following Lemmata.
Note that Lemma 1 immediately implies the first part of Theorem 1, because Q(ξ)(= lim δ→1 E (δ)) is closed (as it is an intersection of closed half-spaces).
Proof of Lemma 1: To show this, it is sufficient to demonstrate (1, 1) / ∈ H(λ) for such λ that ∀α λ · (1, 1) ≥ λ · g(α). Conceptually, this is quite simple. To sustain a point near (1, 1) , the players need to play C with a sufficiently large probability, and this implies that each player's defection makes X more likely. This means that both players should be punished when X arises. As this entails welfare loss, it is impossible to sustain any point near (1, 1) . This intuitive argument can be formulated as follows. Recall that (1, 1) / ∈ H(λ) is equivalent to
where the supremum is taken over α and x such that α is enforced by x which satisfies λ · x(ω) ≤ 0 for all ω. Recall that D ε denotes the mixed strategy which plays D with probability ε. Let ε 00 (ξ) ≡ ξ ξ+∆(ξ) be the minimum ε such that P (X|D ε , D) ≤ P (X|D ε , C), and let
Hence, (2) is proved if we show that there is also a constant K such that for
Note that, when α / ∈ M , each player plays D with probability less than ε 00 (ξ). This means that, by the definition of ε 00 (ξ), any player's deviation makes X more likely, so that both players should be punished when X is realized. This entails a welfare loss, which determines the above bound K.
and by using this we can obtain an upper bound for
p(X|C,α 2 ) > 1 is the likelihood ratio given α 2 . Similarly, we can obtain a bound for
where L ≡ p(X|D,C) p(X|C,C) . The inequalities are implied by (i) λ i > 0, i = 1, 2 and 1 ≥ max {g 1 (C, α 2 ) , g 2 (α 1 , C)} and (ii) L ≥ L α i > 1, i = 1, 2. Thus we have shown the required condition (3) with
Proof of Lemma 2:
To establish the claim we will identify certain point(s) contained in the half-space H(λ) for each direction λ 6 = 0. This provides a subset of Q(ξ), and we will show that this subset tends to V * as ξ → 0.
This is true because Nash equilibrium (0, 0) is sustained by x i ≡ 0, i = 1, 2. Note that the above claim implies
This is established by showing that (D, C)
is enforceable while λ·x (ω) = 0 is satisfied. This is an easy case, because any player's deviation at this point makes Y more likely, and λ 1 > 0, λ 2 ≤ 0 implies that the sidepayment scheme x can punish both players when Y arises without any welfare loss 8 (i.e., λ · x (ω) = 0). The incentive constraints are
x 2 (X) . The incentive constraints are satisfied by taking x 2 (X) large enough, because − λ 2 λ 1 is non-negative. 8 Precisely speaking, when λ2 = 0, the efficient punishment condition λ · x ≡ 0 requies that player 1 receives no punishment (x 1 ≡ 0). However, this is not a problem, as player 1 is taking a myopic best reply at (D, C).
Recall that D ε denotes a mixed action profile where D is played with probability ε. With this notation, we show the following.
It is sufficient to show that, for all ε ∈ [ε 0 (ξ) , 1], (D ε , C) is enforceable while satisfying λ · x (ω) = 0 (note that (D ε , C) = (D, C) for ε = 1). Before going into the formal proof, let us provide some intuition. We first discuss the case ε 6 = 1 so that player 1 is mixing C and D. Calculation shows that, if ε > ξ ξ+∆(ξ) , the profitable deviation (to D) by each player affects the signal asymmetrically. That is, defection by 1 makes X more likely, while defection by 2 makes Y more likely. Hence, to deter the profitable deviations, we may transfer payoff from 2 to 1 when Y arises, and this causes no welfare loss ( λ · x (ω) = 0).
However, this is not the end of the story, because 1 should be indifferent between C and D. This indifference condition determines the magnitude of the transfer x, and it should be sufficiently large to deter player 2's defection. There are two factors which help to satisfy player 2's incentive constraint.
First, the signal must not be too insensitive to 2's defection. Recall that 2's action makes Y more likely if player 1's mixing probability ε is more than ξ ξ+∆(ξ) . Because the signal becomes completely insensitive to 2's action when ε is exactly equal to ξ ξ+∆(ξ) , the mixing probability must be bounded away from ξ ξ+∆(ξ) . This bound is equal to ε 0 (ξ) (to be determined in what follows).
Second, the magnitude of transfer should be large enough. Our condition ξ → 0 achieves this goal 9 . When ξ is small, the signal becomes insensitive to player 1's defection, so that we need a large payoff transfer to keep him indifferent between C and D.
Finally, the case ε = 1 can be treated as a special case of the above construction (although a much simpler argument works, because player 1 need not be indifferent between C and D in this case). This completes the 9 Technically, this is seen as follows; a sufficiently small ξ guarantees that the lower bound of the mixing probability ε 0 (ξ) obtained above is actually less than 1.
intuitive explanation, and now let us provide the formal proof for Case 3. The incentive constraints are
(1 is indifferent), and
does not want to play D).
The first constraint and λ · x (ω) = 0 for ω ∈ (X, Y ) are satisfied, if we choose
As for the second constraint, the RHS
Calculation shows that this is larger than εh
Symmetric arguments apply to the remaining cases. Hence, when
where Co denotes the convex hull (see Figure A) . The reader can verify from the figure that Q (ξ) ⊂ H(λ) for each case discussed above (Case 1 is depicted in the figure) .
A Simple Example of the Folk Theorem without the Pairwise Full Rank Condition
The feasibility of efficient asymmetric punishment is the basic driving force of the FLM folk theorem, and one of the sufficient conditions to facilitate asymmetric punishment is the pairwise full rank condition. As we have seen in Section 2, however, the preceding model has the property that the pairwise full rank condition is not satisfied but asymmetric punishment is feasible. This suggests that we may obtain the folk theorem under a weaker set of assumptions. In fact, a minor modification of the preceding model provides a fairly simple example where the folk theorem holds without the pairwise full rank condition. Suppose that we have the same stage game payoff (the prisoners' dilemma) and assume that the signal ω = X, Y is distributed as follows.
The same argument as in Section 2 shows that the FLM pairwise full rank condition is violated at all the pure action profiles, basically because the number of outcomes is small relative to the number of actions. 10 Nonetheless, the basic idea behind FLM is still valid. For example, consider (C, C) . It is possible to distinguish different players' deviations here; X is more likely if player 1 deviates, and Y is more likely if player 2 deviates (assuming that ξ is positive). Therefore efficient punishments based on transfer of utility (á la FLM) can still be employed to support the efficient action profile without any efficiency loss.
The more tricky part is to support the asymmetric profiles with respect to a variety of hyperplanes. For example, consider another efficient point (D, C). At this point, either player's deviation makes Y more likely, so that asymmetric punishment is not feasible. However, since player 1's deviation (to C) is unprofitable, we may be able to transfer, without violating the incentive constraints, player 2's continuation payoff to player 1, when Y is realized. We have to check if this transfer, which makes player 1's deviation to C more attractive, is not too large to wipe out the loss associated with the unprofitable deviation to C. It turns out that we can overcome this potential problem by the particular payoff structure of the Prisoners' dilemma (see Case 2 in the proof).
The enforceability of a given action profile on various hyperplanes is the core to achieve the folk theorem. FLM's pairwise full rank condition ensures this by requiring that the linear combinations of relevant signal distributions are distinct. Kandori and Matsushima [7] pointed out that this can be weakened by requiring that the convex combinations of relevant signal distributions are distinct. An essential condition of theirs is satisfied at (C, C) in our example 11 . This fails at (D, C) and (C, D), however, as 10 On the other hand, the individual full rank condition of FLM is satisfied at every action profile.
11 At this point, Player 1, by deviating with a certain probablitiy, can create a convex combination of ( ) and ( − ξ) (those vectors represent (probability of X, probabiity of Y )). This is distinct from what Player 2's deviations create (convex combinations either player's deviation creates the same distribution. Still, those points can be enforced on hyperplanes as we argued above, because of the special payoff structure. This suggests that we can obtain even weaker set of conditions for the enforceability on hyperplanes, by imposing restrictions jointly on the information structure and the deviation payoffs. This issue is being addressed in work in preparation by Harrison Cheng [3] . Now we are ready to prove the following result.
Theorem 2
The model in this section violates the pairwise full rank condition but the folk theorem holds; for any ξ > 0, lim δ→1 E (δ) = V * Proof: We continue to use the Fudengerg-Levine Algorithm and demonstrate Q(ξ)(= lim δ→1 E (δ)) = V * .
This case is obvious.
This is established by showing that (D, C) is enforceable while λ·x (ω) = 0 is satisfied. The incentive constraints are
x 2 (X) . Then these two inequality constraints become
) and (
), ( + ξ) are linearly dependent (so that the pairwise full rank condition fails).
If λ 2 ≤ 0, these constraints can be satisfied by taking x 2 (X) large enough. So suppose not. Then we can find a x 2 (X) to satisfy these inequalities if and only if
The incentive constraints are
These can be satisfied by, for example,
x 2 (X) by taking x 2 (X) large enough while λ · x (ω) = 0 is satisfied.
Note that the symmetric argument of case 2 applies to the remaining case; λ 2 > 0,
For this case, the incentive constraints are
Then we can set x 1 (X) = x 2 (X) = 0 and x 2 (Y ) = − 
Relationship to the Blackwell-Monotonicity
The example in Section 3 seemingly contradicts Kandori [6] , which shows that the equilibrium payoff set becomes smaller when observability is reduced in Blackwell's sense. In this section we explain the precise relationship between our example and Kandori [6] .
Recall that a signal ω 0 is less informative than ω in Blackwell's sense, if there exists a function q (·|·) ≥ 0 such that P ω 0 ∈Ω q (ω 0 |ω) = 1 and p 0 (ω 0 |a) = P ω∈Ω q (ω 0 |ω) p (ω|a) for each ω ∈ Ω (where p 0 (ω 0 |a) and p (ω|a) denote the associated distribution functions). When this condition holds, we say that ω 0 is a garbling of ω. It is easy to see that, when public randomization device is available, any equilibrium strategy under the less informative signal ω 0 can be mimicked under the better signal ω. This is because the players can garble the signal by themselves via public randomization device. Inspection of the equilibrium conditions immediately shows that the strategy profile thus constructed is also an equilibrium under the better signal ω. Hence, when ω 0 is a garbling of ω, we have E ω 0 (δ) j E ω (δ) for any δ ∈ [0, 1), where E ω 0 (δ) and E ω (δ) denote the public perfect equilibrium payoff sets under signal ω 0 and ω. Kandori's results [6] are built on this observation. Kandori pointed out that the same is true without public randomization when signal is a continuous variable, and he went on to show E ω 0 (δ) $ E ω (δ) under certain regularity conditions.
To demonstrate the precise relationship between those observations and our example, we now show that a similar result is obtained (without public randomization) in the current setting (i.e., with the finite signal space) in the limit (δ → 1). Let Q ω 0 and Q ω be the set Q (= lim δ→1 E(δ)) associated with ω 0 and ω respectively.
Proposition 1
If ω 0 is a garbling of ω, Q ω 0 j Q ω .
Proof: Take any feasible (α 0 , x 0 ) for the optimization problem with p 0 for direction λ. Consider (α 0 , x) where x is defined by x (ω) = P ω 0 ∈Ω q (ω 0 |ω) x 0 (ω 0 ) . Then (α 0 , x) is feasible for the optimization problem with p for the direction λ because the feasible set of x is convex and the incentive constraints are automatically satisfied. Moreover, it is also clear that (α 0 , x) achieves the same value as (α 0 , x 0 ). This implies that H p 0 (λ) ⊂ H p (λ) for any λ, therefore Q ω 0 j Q ω .Q.E.D.
This logically implies that, although our signalling structure gets "less informative" as ξ → 0, it does so not in the sense of Blackwell. In fact, it is not so difficult to see that, in the limit, the assumption for Theorem 1 precludes a signalling structure which is less informative by Blackwell's criterion.
Suppose that p n+1 is a garbling of p n for n = 0, 1, ... and kp n (·|CD) − p n (·|CC)k converges to 0 as n → ∞, where p 0 (ω|a) = p (ω|a) . Since p n+1 (·|a) = A n p n (·|a) where A n is a matrix defined by for some x ∈ [0, 1] . This implies that kp n (·|DD) − p n (·|DC)k also converges to 0, and, moreover, kp n (·|CD) − p n (·|CC)k and kp n (·|DD) − p n (·|DC)k converges to 0 at the same speed. 12 This is in conflict with our assumption lim ξ→0 ξ ∆(ξ) = 0.
12 Formally, let x = (x 1 , x 2 ) and y = (y 1 , y 2 ) be any two distinct signal distributions on {X, Y } . Then 
